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SHAPE UP OR SHIP OUT: 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THIRD 
PARTIES FOR PATENT 
AMBIGUITIES IN 
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS 
ANGELA M. VALLARIO * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The attorney's preparation of a testamentary document 1 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as a will2 or revocable trust3) should 
* Angela M. Vallario is an Assistant Professor at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. B.S., University of Florida; J.D., University of Baltimore School of 
Law; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University Law Center. 
I. In this article, references to the term 'testamentary' document are intended to 
include a valid will and/or valid revocable trust. A will becomes effective upon the 
testator's death. A revocable trust becomes irrevocable upon the settlor's death. This 
article's focus is limited to the disposition of the preparer's property at his or her death 
through these testamentary documents. See Black's Law Dictionary 1513 (Bryan A. 
Gamer ed., 8th ed., West 2004). Other testamentary documents, such as life estate 
deeds, are beyond the scope of this article. 
2. A valid will is prepared in accordance with the statutory formalities. Every 
jurisdiction requires statutory formalities in order for the document to constitute an 
effective testamentary transfer. E.g. Cal. Prob. Code § 6100 (West 1991 & Supp. 
2004); Md. Estate & Trust Code Ann. §§ 4-101-4-102 (LEXIS 2001 & Supp. 2004); 
N. Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3-2.1 (McKinney 2004). Additionally, an individual 
preparing the testamentary document (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "testator") 
must possess legal and testamentary capacity as well as testamentary intent. See also 
Joel C. Dobris, Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Estates & Trusts, 478 (2d ed., 
West 2003). 
3. Except for a few jurisdictions, the preparation of a revocable trust generally is 
not monitored by statutory formalities. See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 689.075 (West 1994 
& Supp. 2004). Throughout this article all references to trusts are limited to a trust in 
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clearly and accurately reflect the client's last wishes.4 Although these 
testamentary documents should reflect the client's intent,5 they often 
fall short of accomplishing that goa1.6 There are numerous examples of 
will and trust construction cases that exhaust tremendous resources in 
an effort to ascertain the client's wishes or intent.7 Many of these cases 
involve the construction of patent8 and/or latent9 ambiguities which 
which the settlor retains the right to revoke and has a retained interest for his or her life. 
Thus, the completed transfer of the beneficial interest takes place upon the settlor's 
death. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 512. 
4. See e.g. Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (stating it was 
a "constitutional right to make a will and have it carried out according to the testator's 
intention"). 
5. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 302; see also Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589, 593 
(1st Cir. 1953) (finding that "the extent ofa beneficiary's interest is determined by the 
intention of the testator ascertained by reading his language with reference to the 
circumstances surrounding its use"); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. McGinnis, 324 F.2d 
458, 462 (3d Cir. 1963) (stating that "[the] intention of the testator must be ascertained 
from a consideration of the entire will, including the language used, the scheme of 
distribution, and the attendant circumstances"); Scott T. Jarboe, Student Author, 
Interpreting a Testator's Intent From the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive 
Linguistics Approach, 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 1365, 1366 n. 6 (2002) (stating that "the 
determination of the testator's intent is the 'pole star' of judicial interpretation"). 
6. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 302 (pointing out that sometimes what the client expects 
and what occurs are markedly different). This difference may result from the natural 
course of events or from attorney malpractice. This article addresses the latter instance 
and what may be done to protect client expectations and the interests of third parties. 
7. See infra pt. IV.B. (providing examples of will construction cases); see also 
Hebden v. Keirn, 75 A.2d 126, 128 (Md. 1950) (finding that it was not the testatrix's 
intention to give the sum of $8,000 to her brother's estate if he predeceased her, and 
therefore, demonstrating that costs of litigation could easily exceed the $8,000 harm to 
the beneficiary). 
8. See e.g. Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30,49 (App. 1876) (stating that "patent 
ambiguities appear[ing] on the face of the writing itself, as a general rule, cannot be 
explained or removed by extrinsic evidence. In such a case, the court's [function is to] 
ascertain the meaning of the words actually employed, not the secret intention of the 
party); Maguire v. Maguire, 34 So. 443, 446 (La. 1903) (holding that when interpreting 
wills, the intent of the testator guides the court, the construction of a will must not put 
into the mouth of the testator that which he refrained from saying); In re Wainwright's 
Estate, 101 A.2d 724, 725 (Pa. 1954) (stating that "where a testator fails to [provide] 
for a contingency which actually happens, courts do not have authority to insert a 
provision into the will and supply the omission under the assumption that it was the 
intention of the testator"). 
9. A latent ambiguity is discovered when the personal representative attempts to 
carry out the provisions of the will or trust. See Scheurer v. Tomberlin, 240 So. 2d 172, 
176 (Fla. App. 1 st Dist. 1970) (finding the absence of actual grandchildren in the face 
of a bequest for the benefit of "presently living grandchildren" was a latent ambiguity 
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should have been resolved by appropriate drafting. lO This article's 
scope is limited to patent ambiguities caused by the attorney's 
negligence and their detrimental impact on third parties. In these 
situations, the patent ambiguity is easily identified and the claim of 
negligence is clear. I I A patent ambiguity is obvious from the face of 
the will and is easily discovered prior to the testator's death. For 
example, a patent ambiguity exists where two different provisions of a 
will dispose of the same plot of land to different devisees. 12 The 
attorney's close reading of the will should have discovered this error. 
The attorney's failure to correct the patent ambiguity prior to the 
testator's death has detrimental consequences for the third party 
harmed. Extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to resolve a 
patent ambiguity, because courts are unwilling to add to or detract from 
the written words of the will. 13 
The Rules of Professional Conduct require competent 
representationl4 of the estate-planning attorneyl5 (hereinafter "Ethical 
Rule"). The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary 
document suggests that the estate-planning attorney has in some way 
failed to render competent legal services. Although a violation of this 
in the will. Extrinsic evidence, including the relation of the parties was admissible to 
show the persons to whom decedent intended). 
10. Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley Johanson, Wills, Trusts and Estates, 409 (6th ed., 
Aspen L. & Bus. 2000). 
II. This author believes that attorneys should also be accountable to third parties in 
the case of some latent ambiguities, but that issue will be addressed in a subsequent 
article. 
12. See William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills vol. 4, § 
32.7,255 (rev. ed., W.H. Anderson Co. 1961); Succession of Neff, 716 So.2d 410,412 
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1998). 
13. See e.g. Hershon v. Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Assn., 864 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. 
1989); Bondv. Wiegardt, 216 P.2d 196,199 (Wash. 1950). 
14. Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004). This rule requires that a "lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation." Id. 
15. The term 'estate-planning attorney' is used throughout this article to mean the 
attorney responsible for preparing the will or revocable trust. The reference in no way 
suggests a specialization or expertise in the estates and trust field and excludes non-
lawyers. If a non-lawyer prepares the testamentary document, it is unclear as to what 
duties and responsibilities attach. See Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good Thing Gone Bad, 59 Md. L. Rev. 595, 620-22 
(2000) (discussing the standard of care and problems associated with non-lawyers 
engaging in this service). 
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Ethical Rule does not give rise to a malpractice action,16 a patent 
ambiguity reflects so poorly on the attorney's standard of care 17 that a 
permitted inference of negligence I 8 should be drawn. 
When the testamentary document includes a patent ambiguity, a 
malpractice action brought by the estate 19 is of little consequence 
because the estate is rarely lessened in value by the negligence.20 
Instead, third parties who lose their inheritances due to a patent defect 
should have legal recourse to be made whole. In this instance, 
compensatory damages should be used as the appropriate remedy in 
which what would have been received but for the error is compared to 
what was received. 21 Yet, current law does not provide a remedy 
16. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers 19 (Aspen L. & 
Bus. 2001); Ann Peters, The Mode Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 609 (1993) (explaining the trend by courts to use the ethics codes as a 
rebuttable presumption of malpractice). 
17. The standard of care in drafting wills varies among jurisdictions. A majority of 
jurisdictions apply one of three standards: An objective standard, community standard 
or subjective standard. See e.g. Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (2d Dist. 
1975) (discussing that the objective standard requires the attorney to use reasonable 
prudence and skill); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397,401 (D.NJ. 
1978) (stating that the community standard compares an attorney's conduct to that of 
other attorneys practicing in the same or a similar community); Palmer v. Nissen, 256 
F. Supp. 497,501 (D. Me. 1966). The subjective standard is based on the premise that 
if an attorney acts on his or her honest, well-founded belief, he or she will not be liable. 
18. See pt. I1I.B.l (discussing the permitted inference of negligence due to the 
existence ofa patent ambiguity). 
19. See Bradley E. S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client-Privity, Malpractice, and the Lack 
of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68 
Tenn. L. Rev. 261, 267 (Winter 2001) (discussing the compelling case for estate-
planning malpractice. "In order to recover for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must 
prove[:] (I) [T]he attorney owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the attorney violated 
that duty, (3) the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of injury to the 
plaintiff, and (4) damages."). 
20. The exception being the costs of will construction litigation. See Eugene F. 
Scoles, Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Ronald C. Link & Patricia Roberts, Problems and 
Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts 213 (6th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000). See 
also Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (App. 1st 
Dist. 1984) (where beneficiaries unsuccessfully argued for the recovery of their costs 
of litigating a will construction case). 
21. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 3 (2d ed., West 1993); see also Hanna v. 
Martin, 49 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1951) (explaining that "[a] fundamental principle of 
the law of damages is that a person injured by breach of contract or by wrongful or 
negligent act or omission shall have fair and just compensation commensurate with loss 
sustained in consequence of defendant's act which gives rise to action"); Phillips v. 
Chesson, 8 S.E.2d 343, 347 (N.C. 1950) (determining that the "objective of any 
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because an attorney's duty to his or her client to draft a testamentary 
document free from patent ambiguities does not automatically extend 
to third parties at the client's death.22 In order to provide an adequate 
remedy to third parties when a testamentary provision fails because of 
a patent ambiguity, changes in the law are warranted. The attorney's 
duty to draft testamentary documents free from patent ambiguities must 
automatically extend to third parties and extrinsic evidence must be 
admissible for the third party to prove harm. These changes will 
provide third parties with both recourse to pursue their claim and a 
remedy. 
This article first describes patent ambiguities and the rule of 
construction relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in 
ascertaining a testator's intent. 23 Secondly, the article addresses the 
attorney's duty of care owed to clients in the preparation of 
testamentary documents. Thirdly, the article analyzes and critiques the 
existing methods used by third parties bringing a cause of action 
against the negligent drafter. Finally, this article addresses alternatives 
and concludes that the only way to adequately police and deter patent 
errors from occurring is to allow the malpractice action to proceed and 
allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence so the third parties are 
able to establish harm. 
II. PATENT AMBIGUITIES AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE 
A. PATENT AND LATENT AMBIGUITY DISTINCTIONS 
The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary document 
prompts will or trust construction litigation because the testamentary 
document is in some way facially unclear. The classification of the 
uncertainty as a patent ambiguity arises when the uncertainty is 
proceeding to rectify a wrongful injury resulting in loss is to restore the victim to his 
original condition, to give back to him that which was lost as far as it may be done by 
compensation in money"). 
22. See infra pt. IV.B. (discussing approaches for accountability to third parties). 
23. The term 'testator' is used generically throughout this article to describe a male 
or female person who prepares a will, and also the client signing the testamentary 
document. In the case of a revocable trust the person creating the trust is referred to as 
"settlor." 
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"apparent on the face" of the document itself.24 This article's 
discussion of a patent ambiguity is limited to when the ambiguity 
amounts to a contradiction,25 or requires the court to fill in the blank 
as to a beneficiary26 or property.27 For example, in Knupp v. District 
ojColumbia,28 the decedent's will stated that his residual estate was to 
pass to a person specified in another paragraph in the will, where no 
designee was named. This uncertainty was labeled a patent one. The 
court excluded extrinsic evidence in support of the intended 
beneficiary, despite the reliability of such evidence, including an 
acknowledgment by the drafting attorney that Mr. Knupp was the 
intended beneficiary. In the case of a patent ambiguity, without the aid 
of extrinsic evidence, the ambiguous provision fails. In KnufP, the 
decedent's property escheated to the District of Columbia.2 The 
patent defect and the scrivener's carelessness are apparent to a 
layperson from the face of the document without the requirement of an 
expert.3D 
When an attorney drafts a testamentary document that includes a 
patent ambiguity, he or she should be liable to those injured. Liability 
24. E.g. Gafford v. Kirby, 512 So.2d 1356, 1362 (Ala. 1987) (characterizing a 
patent ambiguity as one that reflects an inadequacy inherent on the face of the 
document existing since the execution of the instrument); In re Estate of Corrigan, 358 
N.W.2d 501, 503 (Neb. 1984) (finding the ambiguity a patent one, that is, one 
appearing on the face of the document, from the language used); see also In re 
Butterfield's Estate, 275 N.W.2d 262, 267 (Mich. 1979); Boatmen's Union Nat. Bank 
v. Welton, 640 S.W.2d 497,502 (Mo. App. 1982). 
25. See Succession of Neff, 716 So. 2d 410, 411-412 (La. App. 1998) (labeling 
ambiguity patent but allowing extrinsic evidence where a will containing two residuary 
clauses with different dispositive schemes-one provision devised the testatrix's 
disposable estate to one daughter and the other disposed the same property in equal 
shares to both daughters); Morse v. Zatkiewiez, 168 S.E. 219, 222-224 (N.c. 1969) 
(considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether testatrix intended to pay alimony 
to her son's ex-wife where the testatrix's will provided for the payment of her son's 
creditors but named someone other than her son as the sole beneficiary of her estate). 
26. Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d 702, 704 (D.C. 1990). 
27. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So.2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986) 
(finding the defect a patent ambiguity where a will contained detailed provisions with 
respect to how a university should award scholarships, but contained no words of 
conveyance). 
28. Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d at 703. 
29. !d. at 703. Property escheats when the decedent dies without heirs. Dobris, 
supra n. 2, at 72. When property escheats it passes to the state or to a designated 
agency of the state. Black's Law Dictionary at 584. 
30. The defect is so obvious there is no need to ascertain the opinion of an expert. 
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in this situation should occur because, like the Res Ipsa Loquitur 
doctrine,31 such an obvious defect "speaks for itself' and reflects a lack 
of due care. To impose a duty on the attorney to draft testamentary 
documents free from patent ambiguities is not unduly burdensome,32 
nor does it amount to a duty to draft litigation-free documents.33 
Therefore, when a patent ambiguity exists in the decedent's 
testamentary document, the malpractice action against the attorney 
should be straightforward because patent defects do not exist in this 
instance but for some degree of negligence. 
More often, will and trust construction cases arise because of the 
existence of a latent ambiguity.34 A latent ambiguity arises when the 
testamentary provisions of the document are applied to the testator's 
property or beneficiaries.35 For example, in one case the word "home" 
31. The Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine permits the jury to infer a defendant's negligent 
conduct "typically, because the 'jury can reasonably draw upon past experience 
common to the community for the conclusion that the adverse event generally would 
not occur absent negligent conduct.'" Scott L. Haworth & Melissa Cronin Welch, 
2002-2003 Survey of New York Law, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 1419,1426 (2004). 
32. See infra pt. IILA.2. (discussing the duty of care owed at the preparation and 
review stage of the estate-planning process). 
33. Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, liS Cal. Rptr. 464, 469 (App. 1st 
Dist. 1984). In Ventura, the attorney prepared a will bequeathing substantial sums to 
various charities, including one designated as "Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (Local or National)," a non-existent organization. The San Francisco Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SFSPCA) asserted that it alone was entitled 
to the funds bequeathed under the particular clause of the will. A class action suit 
against the drafting attorney alleged that the ambiguity in the will constituted a breach 
of contract, negligence, and professional malpractice. The court rejected this contention 
stating that no good reason existed why the attorney should be held accountable for 
using certain words suggested or selected by the testator which later proved to be 
ambiguous. If such a rule were adopted, the duty thus created, would amount to a 
requirement to draft litigation-proof legal documents. This unlimited liability, as the 
trial judge observed, would result in a speculative and almost intolerable burden on the 
legal profession. Id. 
34. See Survey of Cases <http://home.ubalt.eduintlavalV 
surveyofrnalpracticecases.htm> (accessed Oct. I, 2004) (providing a survey of 
malpractice actions by jurisdiction); see e.g. In re Carney's Will, 47 N.Y.S.2d 399, 399 
(N.Y. Surrog. 1943) (finding latent ambiguity where a name used in will to designate a 
residuary legatee was equally applicable to two persons with identical names and in 
equal degree of kinship to testatrix); Hawkins v. Garland's Adminstr., 76 Va. 149, 157 
(1882) (admitting extrinsic evidence to show testator's intent to give $1,000 to each of 
four of his namesakes, the last of whom he described as "Samuel G., son of Captain 
John F. Slaughter," when there was no such person). 
35. Harris v. Hines, 137 S.W. 3d 898, 908 (Tex. App. 6th Dist. 2004) (stating a 
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was ambiguous, and will construction litigation was required to 
determine whether the decedent intended the word to mean the 
principal residence or the residence and abutting acreage.36 Latent 
ambiguities can arise for reasons other than the attorney's negligence, 
such as a miscommunication by the client. For example, a will that 
bequeaths "my 1999 BMW to Joe" results in a latent ambiguity if at the 
testator's death, he had a son and grandson both named Joe. This latent 
defect, which becomes apparent only when the personal representative 
attempts to carry out the provisions of the will, could have resulted 
from a number of reasons.37 In order to ascertain the testator's 
intended specific legatee, extrinsic evidence, such as the testator's lack 
of knowledge of his grandson, is admissible to shed light on the 
testator's intent. 38 
B. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
The classification of the ambiguity as patent or latent is important 
in will and trust construction cases because there are different rules 
regarding the admission of extrinsic evidence used to resolve the 
uncertainty. The resolution of the ambiguity with the admission of 
extrinsic evidence often allows the third party to take,39 making the 
malpractice action moot.40 
"latent ambiguity" exists when the will appears to convey a sensible meaning on its 
face, but it cannot be carried out without further clarification). See also In re Lepley's 
Estate, 17 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 1945); Carney v. Johnson, 422 P.2d 486, 488 
(Wash.I967);InreGibbs'Estate, III N.W.2d413,4I7(Wis.I96I). 
36. See In re Sandersfeld's Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (App. 4th Dist. 1960) 
(stating that when ascertaining intent, other doctrines such as plain meaning, personal 
usage exception, and others are employed); see also Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in 
Wills Resultingfrom Scriveners' Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 13 (1990). 
37. Latent ambiguities could also arise from the attorney's negligence. For example, 
the failure of the attorney to ascertain the testator's blood relatives and his or her 
failure to better identify the specific legatee could have caused the latent ambiguity. 
See infra Part II1.A.1. (discussing the attorney's obligations in obtaining accurate and 
complete information). 
38. But see Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 102 (1852) (holding that the mistake doctrine 
would not be applicable where a testatrix drafted her will with the impression that her 
son had predeceased her because in using mistake "it must also appear what would 
have been the will of the testatrix but for the mistake"). 
39. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1986) 
(allowing the residual estate to pass to a university because of the will's failure to 
otherwise dispose of it). See also In re Campbell, 42 Haw. 586, 592 (1958) (holding 
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1. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence for Patent Ambiguities 
Historically, the rule of construction required a patent ambiguity 
to be resolved from the document itself, not from extrinsic evidence 
("no-extrinsic evidence rule,,).41 It is believed that an ambiguity which 
appears in the writing can only be cured by the writing itself; i.e., by 
merely construing the writing.''U The argument is that if the words in 
the will had to be written and the testator constructed the will with 
thought and express language, and did not go outside to express his 
intent, then those who read the written words are not allowed to go 
outside the will to aid in its interpretation.43 
The testator's absence and the uncertainty surrounding the 
extrinsic evidence have precluded its use to resolve patent 
ambiguities.44 Extrinsic evidence would make the will hollow.45 In 
that "if two constructions of a will are each fairly possible, one of which indicates 
absurd or unjust intention, and the other indicates reasonable and fair intention, [the] 
courts [prefer] that the construction which indicates a reasonable and fair intention"); 
Poe v. Sheehan, 151 N.E.2d 660,665 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1958) (finding that, where 
decedent has expressed his wishes for succession of his property in a properly executed 
will, every reasonable effort must be made to avoid intestacy). 
40. A third party provided a remedy by the court from the estate does not have a 
second cause of action against the attorney. However, when the third party is not made 
whole because the extrinsic evidence is insufficient or inadmissible, a malpractice 
action will more likely proceed. See Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at *5 (D.C. 
July 14, 1992). 
41. See Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30,46 (1876) (holding that using extrinsic 
evidence for the purpose of showing what property was intended to be conveyed was 
inadmissible because it failed to state any property on which a bequest could operate 
and there was not an expression elsewhere in the will by which the omission could be 
supplied); accord Helmer v. Voss, 646 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. 1983) (admitting 
extrinsic evidence to resolve patent ambiguity about the identity of beneficiaries, their 
relationship to the testators, and the nature and extent of testators' holdings; but then 
looking to the language of the will after such explanatory material had been 
considered); but see Matter of Estate of Arend, 373 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn. App. 
1985) (admitting extrinsic evidence to resolve both patent and latent ambiguities in 
will); In re Hurley, 248 N.W. 194, 195 (S.D. 1933) (allowing the use of extrinsic 
evidence in a case involving a patent ambiguity). 
42. James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 
416 (Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (originally published 1898). 
43. Id. at 417 (explaining the historical development of the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence). 
44. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1373 n. 51 (citing Andrea Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: 
Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 Real Prop., 
Prob. & Trust J. 811,815 (2001) (discussing courts' tendency to "doubt the reliability 
of extrinsic evidence"». 
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the case of a patent ambiguity, the concern over the reliability of such 
evidence also stifled its introduction. For example, a will that disposes 
of property to an unknown beneficiary would germit countless claims, 
causing great inconveniences and uncertainty. 0 In excluding extrinsic 
evidence, one court stated no language in the will could lead a court to 
infer the testator's intent.47 
The reluctance of the courts to admit extrinsic evidence to reform 
a will in accordance with the testator's objective intent is warranted.48 
There will always be some risk and uncertainty associated with the use 
of extrinsic evidence. The nature of a will and its effectiveness upon 
the creator's death prohibit courts from ascertaining the testator's 
actual intent. When a testator goes through the effort of preparing a 
will, he or she has the right to expect that the language used in the 
testamentary document will be honored.49 Without these expectations, 
the preparation of the will is meaningless. For these reasons this article 
is not proposing that the fundamental purposes of will and trust 
formalities be ignored even in cases of an attorney's obvious 
negligence. However, when an attorney takes on the responsibility of 
preparing a testamentary document, he or she should not only 
understand and appreciate its significance but also take additional 
precautions to ensure it is prepared correctly and accurately. 
The application of the no-extrinsic-evidence rule to a 
testamentary document involving a patent ambiguity is illo§ical, 
because a contradiction, 50 or the failure to identify a beneficiary 1 or 
property52 can never be resolved from the document itself. The 
application of the no-extrinsic-evidence rule causes the patent 
45. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 210 (discussing the Statute of Frauds and Wills Act 
requirement for a writing protects the testator from fraud, undue influence, and 
mistake). If by using extrinsic evidence someone is permitted to add or change the 
written words of the testator, the will would be of no practical use. Dukeminier & 
Johanson, supra n. 10, at 426. 
46. Thayer, supra n. 42, at 416. 
47. Id. at 417 (excluding extrinsic evidence resulted in the beneficiary, the testator's 
son, not taking). 
48. James L. Robertson, Myth and Reality or, Is It "Perception and Taste?" in the 
Reading of Donative Documents, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1045, 1051-1052 (1993). 
49. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1374 n. 59. 
50. Succession afNeff, 716 So. 2d 410, 411 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998). 
51. Knupp v. D.C, 578 A.2d 702,705 (D.C. 1990). 
52. Wilson v. First Fla. Bank, 498 So. 2d 1289,1290 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986). 
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provision to fail and eliminates any chance of recovery from the estate 
for the third party harmed. Instead, the testator's heirs or unintended 
beneficiaries are more likely to benefit from the patent ambiguity when 
the court refuses to admit extrinsic evidence. The application of the 
no-extrinsic-evidence rule to patent ambiguities places third parties 
who fall victim to a patent defect in a much worse position than third 
parties affected by a latent defect. 53 In the case of a patent defect, third 
parties will be forced to bring a malpractice action against the 
attorney. 54 Third parties also face the roadblock of satisfying the 
jurisdiction's rule concerning the attorney's liability to third party 
beneficiaries.55 If they are unable to brin~ the malpractice action 
because the jurisdiction follows strict privity, 6 or if they are unable to 
satisfy the Jurisdiction's exceptions to strict privity57 or other 
approaches,5 it is shocking that the third party harmed by such an 
obvious defect may be without a remedy and that the attorney 
responsible may be immune from liability. 
2. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence for Latent Ambiguities 
The rule of construction as to extrinsic evidence developed 
differently for latent ambiguities. The courts began in the sixteenth 
century, grudgingly and cautiously, to allow extrinsic evidence to 
explain latent uncertainties.59 Courts were willing to admit extrinsic 
evidence to shed light on the testator's intent and clarify that which was 
written,60 but not to add t061 or detract from the written words of the 
53. See supra pt. II.B.2. (discussing the rule of construction and outcomes for latent 
ambiguities). 
54. Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at **2-4 (D.C. July 14, 1992); Knupp v. 
D.C., 578 A.2d at 705. 
55. See infra pt. IV. B (discussing the attorney's accountability to third parties when 
the testamentary document he or she has prepared includes a patent ambiguity). 
56. Infra pt. IV.B.l. 
57. Infra pt. IV.B.2. 
58. Infra pt. IV.B.3. 
59. Thayer, supra n. 42, at 416. 
60. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 427; see also Succession of Bacot, 
502 So. 2d 1118, 1123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (admitting extrinsic evidence to 
determine the testator's relationship with the intended legatee where the testator left a 
holographic will which left all to "Danny" with whom testator lived and maintained an 
ongoing homosexual relationship, and not to other "Dannies" with whom testator 
allegedly had homosexual relationships lasting only several months). 
61. See Assoc. of Survivors of the Seventh Ga. Regiment v. Larner, 3 F .2d 201, 203 
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Will.62 For example, in the "my 1999 BMW to Joe" hypothetical, the 
latent ambiguity lies in which "Joe" was intended by the testator. 
The classification of an ambiguity as patent or latent varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction,63 which has led to drastic differences as to 
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence and outcomes.64 Additionally, 
in an effort to arrive at a more equitable result, some jurisdictions have 
eliminated the distinction, noting that the patent/latent distinctions 
served "no useful purpose.,,65 In jurisdictions where the distinction 
(D.C. 1925) (finding certain conditions must be present to warrant the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence; and in all cases in which such evidence has been received, it was 
utilized only for the purpose of interpreting something actually written in the will and 
never to add provisions to the will); Succession of Merritt, 581 So. 2d 728, 729 (La. 
App. 1st Cir. 1991) (using extrinsic evidence to determine what the words of the 
testator, as written actually meant; not to rewrite a will or do violence to its terms); see 
also In re Estate of Brownlee, 654 N.W.2d 206, 211 (S.D. 2002) (finding that when 
interpreting a will, extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the persons and property 
referred to in the will and to enable the court to apply the words of the will to the 
matter to which it relates). 
62. Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 3.1 
(1999). 
63. See In re Sandersfeld's Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (App. 4th Dist. 1960) 
(labeling the meaning of the word "home" as a latent ambiguity and allowed extrinsic 
evidence); Carlisle v. Est. of Carlisle, 252 So. 2d 894,895-96 (Miss. 1971) (finding 
that the word meaning of the "home" a patent ambiguity and thus allowing extrinsic 
evidence). 
64. See Survey of Cases, supra n. 34 (presenting a survey of malpractice case where 
the courts' different labeling has lead to a different rule with respect to the admission 
of extrinsic evidence). 
65. See e.g. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 2001). The will 
bequeathed to appellant Vining "the sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($25,000)." 
Id. at 817. The attorney submitted an affidavit that it was the testator's intent to leave 
$25,000 not $200,000. The Supreme Court of Minnesota allowed extrinsic evidence to 
ascertain the testator's intent, and stated, 
[W]e are satisfied that the trial court correctly denigrated the usefulness of a 
distinction between patent and latent ambiguities for determining what type 
of extrinsic evidence should be considered when construing ambiguous or 
contradictory provisions. Because it is reasonable for the Minnesota 
judiciary to weigh evidence of the testator's declarations of intent, the basis 
of the patent/latent distinction appears outmoded.... We appreciate in 
general, the frustration scriveners encounter in trying to express perfectly 
their client's wishes, which frequently creates ambiguities, such that justice 
requires consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine intent . . . we no 
longer view testimony about the testator's declarations of intent as inherently 
unreliable. 
Id.at819. 
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continues, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence to resolve patent 
ambiguities understandably stems from the possibility of fabrication.66 
This article recognizes that there are distinctions between patent 
and latent uncertainties. The disparate treatment by the courts over the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence is analyzed.67 The existence of a 
patent ambiguity in a testamentary document violates strong public 
policy and the law must provide an adequate remedy to a third party 
harmed by the patent ambiguity. In order to provide this remedy, the 
attorney's duty to draft testamentary documents free from patent 
ambiguities must be automatically extended to third parties and 
extrinsic evidence must be admissible to show harm.68 
III. DUTY OF CARE OWED TO CLIENT IN THE PREPARATION OF WILLS 
AND REVOCABLE TRUSTS 
When an attorney renders services to prepare a will or trust, an 
attorney-client relationship69 exists between the testator and drafting 
attorney, and it is the testator to whom the attorney owes "professional 
responsibility.,,70 The attorney is expected to draft a valid document71 
that disposes of the client's property in accordance with the client's 
66. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1374 n. 157. 
67. See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Estate of Kirk: Mortmain. Perpetuities. Extrinsic 
Evidence. Aaargh!, 39 Advocate (newsletter of the Idaho State Bar) 21, 24 (July 1996). 
68. See infra pt. V (discussing that extrinsic evidence should be admissible to deter 
future harm). 
69. 48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship 525 
(1987). The existence of an attorney-client relationship involves a question of fact. 
Courts will find an attorney-client relationship where there is a contract for legal 
services between particular parties or a gratuitous undertaking. Robinson v. Benton, 
842 So. 2d 631, 635 (Ala. 2002) (citing Williams v. Jackson Co., 359 So. 2d 798 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1978)). Upon the establishment of an attorney-client relationship, a 
fiduciary responsibility exists and carries with it the requirement of utmost good faith 
and loyalty. See e.g. Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor. Inc., 612 A.2d 322, 327 (Md. 
App. 1992). Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach 
immediately. Once it is determined that a duty is owed by the attorney to the client, the 
general rule with respect to the liability of an attorney for failure to properly perform 
his or her duties, is that the attorney is required to render ordinary skill in the 
performance of the tasks which he or she undertakes. Blair v. lng, 21 P.3d 452, 460 
(Haw. 2001) (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)); see also Model R. of 
Prof. Conduct 1.\, 1.3 & 1.7 (ABA 2003) (discussing the relevant duties of particular 
importance in the estate-planning context). 
70. See Model R. of Prof. Conduct R. 1.\, 1.3, 1.7. 
71. See supra nn. 2-3 (discussing what is required to prepare a valid will and trust). 
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testamentary wishes, provided these wishes fall within legal 
boundaries. Various limitations are imposed on the testator's wishes, 
such as provisions that violate public policy; 72 provisions that attempt 
to defeat the spouse's elective share; 73 and provisions drafted in 
violation of the rule against perpetuities.74 To the extent the client 
desires to incorporate provisions beyond legal parameters, the attorne.rs 
is obligated to advise the client as to the risks associated therewith. 5 
Furthermore, the attorney's failure to counsel the client on legal 
boundaries could result in a malpractice action.76 
Other than a jurisdiction's statutory formalities 77 or 
requirements,78 there are no requirements or mandatory procedures for 
the preparation of a will or trust. Various obligations associated with 
the preparation of a will have developed as case law. One court stated 
when an attorney is hired to prepare a will [or draft a revocable 
trust], the attorney's obligation is to: (1) Inquire into the client's 
heirs at law,19 (2) offer a proper explanation, (3) advise the client 
72. Will provisions requiring waste, or conditioned on the beneficiary obtaining a 
divorce, are examples of provisions which violate public policy. See In re Estate of 
Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (\977) (stating that a will provision, which directed the 
fiduciary to demolish two houses located on testator's property, violated public policy 
and was not enforceable, because the cost of demolition, annual property taxes, and 
maintenance without the benefit of rental income to offset such losses was considered 
waste); see also Fineman v. C. Natl. Bank of Cleveland, 175 N.E.2d 837,841 (Ohio 
App. 8th Dist. 1961) (holding that the public policy of Ohio does not countenance a 
bequest or device conditioned on the beneficiary's obtaining a separation or divorce 
from his wife). 
73. See Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the 
Division of Property at Death, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 519, 530 nn. 46-47 (2003) 
(providing a listing of jurisdictions with elective share statutes). 
74. See generally John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, § 201, 191 
(Roland Grayed., 4th ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1942). See also Angela M. Vallario, 
Death By A Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. Legis. 141, 156 
(1999). 
75. For example, should the testator wish to disinherit his or her estranged spouse, 
the attorney is obligated to advise the client of the surviving spouse's right to file an 
election against the will and frustrate his or her testamentary plan. See Vallario, supra 
n 73, at 541-42. 
76. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961) (allowing a malpractice 
action by the will beneficiaries for the attorney's failure to draft a trust in accordance 
with the rule against perpetuities). 
77. See supra n. 2 (noting the formality requirements of a will). 
78. See supra n. 3 (noting the requirements of a trust). 
79. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 7. Heirs are determined at one's death as the takers under 
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as to his or her heirs at law, (4) explain the significance of 
including or excluding all heirs at law in a will, and (5) prepare a 
will according to the client's [legal] directions.8o 
73 
If essential steps and procedures are followed, the patent ambiguity 
problem discussed herein could be minimized. Thus, this article 
suggests that when an attorney renders estate-planning services, he or 
she should incorporate detailed steps and procedures which do not 
overly burden the estate-planner and will likely result in testamentary 
documents being prepared free from patent defects. 
A. ESSENTIAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD 
BE FOLLOWED IN THE PREPARATION OF 
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS 
There are several steps in the preparation of testamentary 
documents, which if incorporated into one's legal practice would 
achieve the attorney's duty to draft testamentary documents free from 
patent ambiguities. As the following sections detail, in the preparation 
of a will or revocable trust, the attorney must obtain information 
regarding the client, his heirs, and legatees.8l He or she then must 
frepare and review the documents,82 supervise the execution process, 
3 and implement the plan.84 Additionally, duties associated with the 
the decedent's intestacy statute. The decedent's heirs are not known when the testator 
is preparing his will. Therefore, this inquiry should include blood relatives such as 
descendants, ancestors and collaterals. Additional potential heirs, including one's 
fiancee and loved ones, should be explored with the client. Id. 
80. Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1062, 1056 (Okla. 2002) (holding that 
absent the testator's request, the attorney had no duty to investigate the testator's heirs 
where four grand-children from the testator's deceased son were considered pre-
termitted heirs and entitled to inherit). 
81. Infra pt. I1I.A.1. (discussing the obtain information step of the estate-planning 
process). 
82. Infra pt. I1I.A.2. (discussing the preparation and review step of the estate-
planning process. Carelessness in the preparation and review stage is likely the culprit 
for a testamentary document with a patent ambiguity). 
83. Infra pt. I1I.A.3. (discussing the will or trust execution ceremony and 
responsibilities associated therewith). 
84. In the case of a revocable trust, the plan is implemented with the transfer of 
assets during the settlor's life so that upon his or her death these non-probate assets 
pass in accordance with the trust terms. Infra pt. III.A.4. (discussing the 
implementation process). 
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will's safekeeping and client communication are oftentimes part of the 
estate-planning process.85 
1. Obtaining Information 
The estate-planning process commences with the collection of 
information from the client. The attorney should obtain complete and 
accurate information regarding relevant matters such as domicile,86 
family members and loved ones, the title and value of probate and non-
probate property, and beneficiary designations on contract 
arrangements such as life insurance policies, annuities, and retirement 
plans. Additionally, information such as citizenship,87 joint owners of 
jointly held property, and contribution components88 are essential to 
providing competent estate-planning services.89 
85. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 218. Ancillary to estate-planning services are issues of 
the document's safekeeping and continued client communication. The attorney should 
advise his or her client with respect to appropriate safekeeping options and risks 
associated therewith. This advice is best conveyed by cover letter and reiterated orally 
at the execution ceremony. Id. 
No jurisdiction imposes a duty of continued client communication on the estate-
planning attorney after the rendering of estate-planning services. Although, changes in 
the law may warrant alterations to one's testamentary documents. Absent an ongoing 
relationship, attorneys are not responsible for advising clients to revisit their estate 
plans. For example, many estate plans implemented aggressive inter vivos gifting 
programs based on the $600,000 Federal exemption amount. LRC. § 2010 (1986). 
These plans should be re-examined in light of the scheduled increases. LR.C. § 2010 
(2004). 
Another more recent example includes the attorney's obligation to contact client due to 
legislative changes. In 2004, the Federal exemption amount is $1,500,000 but some 
states capped the state estate tax at $1,000,000. See Md. Sen. 508, 2004 Gen. 
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2004). After the state legislation was enacted, many estate plans 
need to be amended. Yet, an attorney is not under an obligation to notify estate-
planning clients to revisit their estate-plans in light of the legislative changes. Even if 
the attorney retains the original testamentary document, it is unlikely that any court 
would impose a general duty of continued communication on the attomey-safekeeper. 
Id. 
86. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 242. 
87. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 461; LR.C. § 2001(a) (West 2002). The imposition of 
the Federal transfer tax is imposed on every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the 
United States. LR.C. § 2056(d)(I). If the surviving spouse of the decedent is not a 
United States citizen the marital deduction is disallowed. Id. 
88. The contribution of consideration towards jointly held property is important in 
determining the property of the estate for Federal estate tax purposes. See I.R.C § 2040 
(stating there shall be excepted [from the value of joint property] such part of the value 
of such property as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such other 
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Much of this information is obtained from a client-prepared form 
and/or client interview. Generally, the client-provided information is 
relied upon and not verified by the attomey.90 In most cases, to impose 
a duty of verification would "expand the obligation of a lawyer who 
drafts a will beyond reasonable limits,,,91 would ;revent the attorney 
from providing reliable and economical services,9 and would place an 
unreasonable burden on the attorney.93 If estate-planning attorneys are 
required to verify client-provided information or hire employees to do 
so, the cost of providing this service will be passed onto the client, thus 
making it too expensive for many individuals. Although not the norm, 
a duty to investigate may be imposed if a client requests investigation94 
or if circumstances demonstrate otherwise.95 For example, the duty of 
inquiry may be imposed on the attorney if the client becomes 
reasonably confused as to what information is to be provided. 
person). 
89. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2003). 
90. Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1057-58 (Okla. 2002) (holding that where 
decedent's heirs sued decedent's lawyer for not including them in decedent's will the 
lawyer was not obligated to conduct an independent investigation of the decedent's 
heirs, apart from the information provided to the lawyer by the decedent, unless 
requested to do so). 
91. Id. at 1058 (citing Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 469 (Wash. 1987)). See 
Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 469 (App. 1st Dist. 
1974) (holding that, where the drafter was liable for costs incurred as a result of a latent 
ambiguity, the attorney could not be accountable for using certain words and that to 
impose such a burden on the attorney would amount to an insurmountable burden). 
92. Leak-Gilbert, 55 P.3d at 1058. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1057. 
95. See Butler v. State Bar of Cal., 721 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1986). In Butler, the Court 
stated "while an attorney may often rely upon statements made by the client without 
further investigation, circumstances known to the attorney may require an 
investigation." Id. at 588. Butler, involved an estate administration where the personal 
representative informed the attorney that the estate had only non-probate assets. [d. at 
586. Based on that information the attorney stated a probate proceeding was not 
necessary. !d. at 586-87. In review of the State Bar of California's recommendation 
for suspension, the Court found the attorney failed to make adequate inquiry, failed to 
obtain relevant information to probate the estate and failed to communicate adequately 
with the beneficiary. Id. at 588-89. 
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2. Prepare and Review 
Once the information is obtained, the estate-planning attorney has 
a duty to draft a valid testamentary document that accurately reflects 
the testator's intent,96 This duty includes an obligation to clarify any 
uncertainties in the client-provided information, explain tax97 and non-
tax ramifications of the testator's wishes, and draft the document in 
accordance with statutory formalities98 and/or legal requirements.99 
On occasion, courts impose a duty to examine potential tax 
problems. lOO In most instances, the court's reluctance to incorporate 
tax-incentive provisions hinges on the need to honor the testator's 
testamentary scheme that is changed when tax provisions are 
incorporated into the testamentary document, 101 For example, 
objectively, most clients take advantage of the Federal exemption 
amount by placing that amount in a credit shelter trust, and making a 
96. See supra n. 5 (discussing the importance of the testator's intent). 
97. Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (App. 3d Dist. 1979) (stating that 
the general practitioner has a duty to refer his client to a specialist or recommend the 
assistance of a specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and skillful 
practitioner would do so). 
98. See Dobris, supra n. 2 (explaining that the testamentary document must satisfy 
the requirements of the jurisdiction in which the decedent is domiciled as of his or her 
date of death); but see Md. Ests. & Trust Code Ann. § 4-104(3) (1974) (discussing that 
savings statutes recognize the testamentary document as being valid provided the 
document is valid in the jurisdiction in which it was executed). 
99. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 473-490 (explaining that a valid trust requires 
ascertainable beneficiary, present intent, legal purpose, and resolution). 
100. Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518-21 (App. 1st Dist. 1976) 
(holding that knowledge of potential tax problems inherent in general powers of 
appointment in a trust were within the ambit of a reasonably competent and diligent 
practitioner); see also Horne, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (holding that a general practitioner 
who acknowledged needing expert assistance regarding tax consequences of the trust 
had the duty to "refer his client to a specialist or recommend the assistance of a 
specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and skillful practitioner 
would do so); but see Barner v. Sheldon, 678 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. L.1995) (holding 
that an attorney who drafted the will and who was subsequently appointed as attorney 
for estate by executrix did not owe duty to inform beneficiaries (testator's children) 
that they had right to disclaim their share of testator's estate in favor of their mother, 
which allegedly would have resulted in avoidance or diminution of Federal estate 
taxes). 
101. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2056 (West 2004) (noting that the most common tax-
incentive provision is the married testator's ability to employ basic Federal estate tax 
savings provisions with a credit shelter trust and unlimited marital deduction, which 
results in the elimination Federal estate taxes on the death of the first spouse). 
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conscious decision to engage in such tax planning. 102 If done, the 
surviving spouse is prevented from having control over the trust assets. 
Thus, the surviving spouse is much more limited than he or she would 
be with an outright distribution. Therefore, courts will not infer the 
attorney's negligence from the testator's failure to engage in this level 
of tax estate planning. 103 The possibility of a valid reason for not using 
the credit shelter trust, precludes the court from presuming its absence 
is due to the preparer's negligence. 
Following the drafting of the testamentary document, the attorney 
has an obligation to review the document to insure its validitylO4 and 
complies with the testator's wishes. 105 At some point in the process 
before execution, documents should be carefully and thoroughly 
reviewed by the attorney for patent defects. Although a patent defect 
could be discovered by the client prior to the document's execution, the 
client's failure to bring an obvious defect to the attorney's attention 
should not prevent his or her malpractice recovery.106 To impose this 
responsibility on the client would be improper and unfair. Thus, the 
client's failure to discover and notify the attorney of the patent defect 
does not make the client contributorily negligent. 107 
The attorney owes duties to his or her client. 108 The discovery by 
the client of the attorney's failure to J'rovide this standard of care 
would result in a breach and damages. lo In this instance damages will 
likely be limited to the refund of fees. 1 10 More often, the error is 
102. I.R.C. § 2010. 
103. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md. 1998) (stating that testators do not 
always intend to avoid taxes, and in order to do so, the testator's must part with 
dominion and control). 
104. But see Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,690 (Cal. 1961) (holding that drafting a 
will so that the trust provisions violated the rule against perpetuities did not amount to 
negligence). 
105. See infra pt. IV.A. (discussing cases where third parties claim the document in 
some way failed to comply with the testator's wishes). 
106. Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at **2-4 (D.C. July 14, 1992) (holding 
that where a third party is able to proceed against the negligent attorney, contributory 
negligence should not mitigate damages). 
107. Id. 
108. See supra n. 69 (discussing the establishment of an attorney-client relationship 
and the respective duties and responsibilities). 
109. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 278. 
110. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md. 1998) (stating in dicta that the 
attorney could correct the will without further compensation or refund his or her fee). 
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discovered at the client's death and because of the testator's absence, 
courts are reluctant to second guess the testamentary intent and impose 
unclear obligations on the attorney. I I I But the existence of a patent 
ambiguity is a defect that should have been corrected and could have 
been eliminated at this stage of the estate-planning process. The 
attorney's failure to render competent services at the preparation and 
review stage causes the harm. 
3. Execution 
The attorney should be involved in the execution of the 
testamentary documents so that the attorney has another opportunity to 
discover a patent ambiguity. A draft forwarded to the client without an 
appropriate explanation of the necessary execution procedures could 
result in a malpractice action. I 12 Often, inadequacies in the execution 
ceremony lead to an invalid will. 11 3 The attorney must supervise or 
adequately inform the client with respect to execution procedures. 
These procedures include instructions regarding signature, witnessing, 
and safekeeping. 114 Although the execution ceremony seems 
straightforward, many problems arise due to inadequate supervision. I IS 
Ill. !d. at 1266 (finding that, where a Federal tax exemption was not maximized as 
part of the client's testamentary wishes, testators do not always intend to avoid taxes 
because doing so requires the testator to part with dominion and control). 
112. See Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207,213 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that non-
lawyer's inadequate supervision of execution of codicil was prima facie negligence); 
accord State ex reI. Neb. St. B. Assn. v. Butterfield, III N.W.2d 543,546 (Neb. 1961) 
(finding that preparation oflegal documents during an attorney's suspension constitutes 
"practice of law); Palmer v. Unauth. Prac. Comm. of the St. B. of Tex., 438 S.W.2d 
374,376 (Tex. App. 14th Dis!. 1969) (noting that the drafting ofa will and supervising 
of its execution constitutes the "practice oflaw"). 
113. See In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1346 (N.J. 1991) (finding that 
the testator's failure to comply with the statutory formalities of signing in the presence 
of the two witnesses resulted in his property passing intestate). 
114. But see Atty. Grievance Commn. v. Myers, 490 A.2d 231, 233 (Md. 1983) 
(illustrating that under certain circumstances an attorney may reasonably believe that 
the client is sufficiently sophisticated and reliable to follow her instructions. An 
attorney prepared a will without an attestation clause, without signature lines, and 
failed to instruct the client properly regarding the manner of execution.). 
115. See e.g. Tomkins v. Beckley, 1999 WL 141328 at *3 (Mar. 9,1999) (discussing 
whether an attorney breached his duty where a will was never formally executed); 
Auric v. ContI. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 2d 325, 327 (Wis. 1983) (finding that the attorney's 
negligence in his supervision of the execution of the will caused damages to the 
beneficiaries where a will was invalid for failure to have the required number of 
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The courts tend to find attorney's negligence for flaws in the 
statutory formalities. In such a situation, ifthejurisdiction does not fix 
the invalid will with substantial compliance,11 the attorney will likely 
be liabley7 Similar to the situation of a testamentary document's 
failure to comply with statutory formalities, when a patent ambiguity 
exists, the attorney should be liable for the consequences of this level 
of intolerable carelessness 
4. Implementation 
After the testamentary document is signed, a will is funded on the 
testator's death, whereas a revocable trust is funded during the settlor's 
lifetime with the transfer of property to the trustee. Some documents 
of transfer, like a deed, must be prepared by an attorney.118 Other 
assets, like bank accounts and brokerage accounts, may be transferred 
without any assistance. 119 The attorney should, at a minimum, advise 
the client on the procedures necessary to implement the trust. 120 The 
failure to implement the trust during the settlor's lifetime is oftentimes 
the result of the attorney's failure to comply with his or her duties in 
rendering estate planning services. But when the attorney's failure to 
implement the living trust is discovered at the death of the settlor, the 
courts are hesitant to presume that the lack of implementation was the 
attorney's fault. Instead, due to the number of potential reasons for the 
settlor's failure to implement, a court is likely to justify it due to the 
possibility that the settlor had second thoughts. 121 
signatures). 
116. In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1346 (N.J. 1991). 
117. Tomkins v. Beckley, 1999 WL 141328 at **3-4. 
118. See e.g. Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 3-104(f)(1) (2003). 
119. For example, opening accounts in the name of the trust by filling out the 
account application, followed by letters of instruction from the client is sufficient to 
accomplish this task. George T. Bogert, Trusts § 32 (6th ed., West 2001). 
120. See e.g. Fla. B. v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 987 (Fla. 1993) (finding that a 
non-lawyer's failure to implement a living trust forced the decedent's heirs to probate 
her estate). 
121. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575,578 (Tex. 1996) Uustifying the defeat of 
a testatrix's pour-over will where there was a defective trust because of the 
"concomitant questions as to the true intentions of the testator"). 
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B. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION AMOUNTS TO A DUTY TO DRAFT 
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS FREE FROM PATENT AMBIGUITIES 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to 
provide his or her client with competent representation. 122 This Ethical 
Rule requires the attorney to demonstrate "legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation." 123 The mere existence of a patent ambiguity in a 
testamentary document reflects an obvious lack of due care and 
departure from competent representation. 124 The patent ambiguity 
should not exist and would not exist had the attorney rendered 
competent services. Clients have a right to expect competence in the 
preparation of their testamentary documents. If it is discovered that the 
legal services rendered fell beneath this required standard of care, 
clients have recourse against the attorney. Although a violation of this 
Ethical Rule does not in and of itself give rise to a cause of action for 
negligence nor was it designed to be a basis for civil liability, the 
violation "may be evidence ofbreach.,,125 
1. Permitted Inference of Negligence Due to the Existence of Patent 
Ambiguity 
This article proposes that the existence of a patent ambiguity 
violates Ethical Rule 1.1,126 and from such violation, a permitted 
inference of negligence should be drawn. 127 The mere existence of a 
patent ambiguity in a testamentary document allows for an inference of 
the preparer's negligence. 128 The permitted inference should be 
allowed because the patent ambiguity could and should have been 
easily avoided with appropriate drafting steps and procedures.129 The 
122. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004) (requiring a lawyer to provide 
clients competent representation, defined as the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation). 
123. Id. 
124. Infra pt. I1I.B.1. (discussing the permitted inference of negligence). 
125. See Gillers & Simon, supra n. 16, at 113. 
126. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004). 
127. Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 301.7 (5th ed., West 
2001); McLain, Maryland Evidence § 301:4 (defining permissible inferences as 
allowing upon the proof of a basic fact, a second fact to be inferred). 
128. Graham, supra n. 127, at § 301.7; McLain, supra n. 127, at § 301:4. 
129. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 409. 
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patent error could and should have been discovered in the preparation 
and review stage of the estate-planning process. 130 For example, if the 
will provision specifically bequeathed real property but failed to 
designate the beneficiary, this error should have been caught during the 
appropriate review of the will. The client's foreseeable absence and 
inability to participate in the action, coupled with the need to provide a 
remedy, mandate this permitted inference. 
IV. THIRD PARTY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE 
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXTENDING ATTORNEY'S 
DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES 
Current law does not automatically extend the attorney's duty to 
draft testamentary documents free from patent ambiguities to third 
parties. However, in order to provide an adequate remedy to those 
harmed, this duty must be extended. This extension is necessary 
because the attorney's failure to render competent services is likely to 
be discovered only after the client's death, which terminates the 
attorney-client relationship and the duties attached therewith. Like the 
bad conduct exception,131 the existence of a patent ambiguity opens the 
door for third party suits. The attorney's gross carelessness that 
resulted in a patent ambiguity should permit the third party to proceed. 
Baseless claims can be controlled by requiring the third party to show 
harm with extrinsic evidence. 
B. ACCOUNTABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
If the document includes a patent ambiguity, the client's absence 
presents a unique hurdle for those harmed by the defective drafting. 
Third parties are left to determine whether they can sue, justifying the 
risks of litigation and funding the suit. Whether a third party can 
successfully bring a cause of action against the attorney who prepared 
the testamentary document with a patent defect depends on the 
jurisdiction. 
Current approaches to third party liability in the preparation of 
testamentary documents are insufficient and fail to provide a remedy to 
130. See supra pt. III. A. 2. (discussing the attorney's duty of care in the preparation 
and review stages of the estate-planning process). 
131. See infra pt. IV.B.2.a. (defining and describing of the bad conduct exception). 
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the third party hanned by the patent ambiguity. 132 This article 
classifies those approaches as strict privity,133 strict privity 
exceptions,134 or other approaches. 135 The third party's inability to sue 
in jurisdictions adhering to the strict privity rule amounts to absolute 
immunity. Several jurisdictions require the third party to satisfy a strict 
privity exception, which offers little practical relief. The majority of 
states have adopted other approaches that allow the third party to sue 
but only after he or she satisfies a sufficient number of elements under 
the balancing of factors test l36 or proves that he or she is a foreseeable 
plaintiff who relied upon the services under the foreseeable reliance 
theory. 137 When the attorney's negligence results in a patent 
ambiguity, these approaches unnecessarily impose significant burdens 
and costs on the third party. 
1. Strict Privity 
Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a third party not in privity138 with an attorney had no cause of 
action against the attorney for negligence. 139 The Court stated that 
absent privity, the attorney would be exposed to countless claims l40 
and would be unable to zealously represent his or her clients. 
Although most jurisdictions no longer follow strict privity, a 
minority of jurisdictions, 14 1 despite its inequities,142 adhere to strict 
132. See infra pt. IV.B. (discussing the current approaches to accountability to third 
parties). 
133. See infra pt. IV.B.1. 
134. See infra pt. IV.B.2. 
135. See infra pt. IV.B.3. 
136. See infra pt. IV.B.3.a. 
137. See infra pt. IV.B.3.b. 
138. Black's Law Dictionary at 1237 (defining pnvlty as "the connection or 
relationship between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in the same 
subject matter"). 
139. Natl. Sav. Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,200 (1879) (finding that, due to 
the lack of privity, a lender could not bring a negligence cause of action against an 
attorney who was acting on behalf of the real estate loan applicant). 
140. [d. at 202. 
141. See e.g. Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002) (upholding the 
rule that a third party cannot sue an attorney without privity, despite the attorney's 
admission of fault in failing to destroy a previous will upon the request of his client); 
Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1983) (dismissing complaint of 
professional negligence against attorneys brought by deceased widow); Lilyhorn v. 
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privity in the situation of estate-planning malpractice. 143 Strict privity 
acts as an absolute bar to the cause of action and constitutes immunity 
for estate-planning attorneys when the defect is discovered after the 
testator's death. Adherence to such a principle in the words of an 
English court is striking, because the real harm is caused when "the 
only person who has a valid claim has suffered no loss and the only 
person who has suffered a loss has no valid claim."I44 
a. Justifications for Strict Privity 
Proponents of strict privity believe that a greater good is being 
served by preserving the attorney's ability to zealously represent clients 
without being compromised by the threat of a suit from third parties. 145 
In those states following strict privity, it is believed strict privity is 
Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1983) (stating that no attorney-client privilege 
existed between the attorney and the decedent's son with respect to the drafting or 
execution of the decedent's will and that the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill 
that an attorney ordinarily owed his client did not extend to third parties); Kramer v. 
Be/fi, 482 N'y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 1984) (applying New York's strict privity 
doctrine, the court denied standing to the beneficiary of a decedent's estate to sue the 
attorney for the executor for allegedly failing to give tax advice that would have saved 
estate taxes); Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (finding that an 
attorney owed a duty of care only to his client and not to third parties who may have 
been damaged by defendant's negligent representation of the client). 
142. See infra pt. IV.B.l.b. 
143. Robinson, 842 So.2d at 637. 
144. Ross v. Caunters, 3 All Eng. Reports 580, 583 (Chancery Div. 1979) (holding 
that the beneficiaries' lack of privity of contract with the attorney-drafter of the will 
was no bar to an action for negligence). The English court observed: 
Id. 
[I]n broad terms, the question is whether solicitors who prepare a will are 
liable to a beneficiary under it if, through their negligence, the gift to the 
beneficiary is void. The solicitors are liable, of course, to the testator or his 
estate for a breach of the duty that they owed to him, though as he has 
suffered no financial loss it seems that his estate could recover no more than 
nominal damages. Yet it is said that however careless the solicitors were, 
they owed no duty to the beneficiary, and so they cannot be liable to her. If 
this is right, the result is striking. The only person who has a valid claim has 
suffered no loss, and the only person who has suffered a loss has no valid 
claim. 
145. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577-579 (The court stated that an attorney retained by a 
testator to draft a trust owed no professional duty of care to persons named as 
beneficiaries thus barring a malpractice suit when the trust was declared invalid. The 
court reasoned that without this privity barrier, clients would lose control over the 
attorney-client relationship and attorneys would be subject to unlimited liability.). 
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necessary to: (1) Prevent frivolous claims by beneficiaries who did not 
benefit under the will as they believed they should, (2) protect the 
attorney-client relationship, (3) prevent the attorney from dividing his 
loyalties between the client and intended beneficiary,146 (4) prevent the 
drafting-attorney from being subject to unlimited liability,147 (5) 
prevent a conflict of interest during the estate-planning process that 
would limit the attorney's ability to represent the client zealously, 148 
and (6) protect the deceased testator's intentions rather than allowing 
beneficiaries to doubt them. 149 Strict privity supporters believe that "in 
drafting testamentary instruments at the behest of a client, an attorney 
should not be burdened with potential liability to possible beneficiaries 
of such instrurnents.,,150 
b. Inequities of Strict Privity 
These public policy arguments favoring strict pnvlty fail to 
address the detrimental impact such a rule has on the third party who is 
left without recourse to pursue his or her remedy. Strict privity 
operates as an absolute bar regardless of the facts and circumstances. 
This harsh rule allows carelessness to occur and continue to occur in 
the preparation of testamentary documents because when the patent 
defect is discovered after the testator's death there is no risk of 
malpractice. 151 In states following strict privity, there is no 
accountability for sloppy and careless drafting. Without accountability 
146. Craig D. Martin, Student Author, Liability of Attorneys to Non-Clients: When 
Does a Duty to Non-Clients Arise?, 23 J. Leg. Prof. 273, 279 (1999) (noting that 
enacting an exception to the strict privity requirement "would subject attorneys to suits 
by heirs who simply did not receive what they believed to be their due share under the 
will or trust. This potential tort liability to third parties would create a conflict during 
the estate planning process, dividing the attorney's loyalty between his or her client and 
the third-party beneficiaries."). 
147. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577. 
148. Id. at 578. 
149. Id. at 577-78; Martin, supra n. 146, at 279. 
150. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 25 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994) (holding that a 
bank's attorney, who drafted a trust agreement for the decedent and later amended the 
testator's will to leave the entire estate to the beneficiaries, but never amended the trust, 
had no duty to the beneficiaries). 
151. See generally id. (illustrating strict privity jurisdictions tendency to make 
negligent estate planners immune from liability when the negligence is discovered after 
the death of his or her client). 
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to third parties, attorneys will not clean up practices or prevent future 
harm. 
Despite the justification for strict privity,152 adherence to such a 
rule in the estate-planning area has a detrimental affect on third parties 
and therefore should not be followed. Most jurisdictions agree and 
have developed exceptions 153 or other rules 154 to provide third parties 
with an avenue for pursuing a remedy. 
2. Strict Privity Exceptions 
Some jurisdictions have softened the consequences of strict 
privity by making narrow strict privity exceptions for defective 
testamentary documents. 155 This article divides the strict privity 
exceptions into three groups: (1) The bad conduct exception,156 (2) the 
third-party beneficiary exception,157 and (3) the frustrated intent 
exception. 158 
152. See supra pt. IV.B.La. 
153. See infra pt. IV.B.2. (discussing strict privity exceptions). 
154. See infra pt. IV.B.3. (discussing other approaches developed to accommodate 
third parties). 
155. E.g. Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (holding that the 
requirement of privity did not extend to a malpractice suit brought by the intended 
beneficiary of a will against the attorneys who drafted it); Simpson v. Calivas, 650 
A.2d 318, 322 (N.H. 1994) (holding that although there was no privity between a 
drafting lawyer and an intended beneficiary, the obvious foreseeability of injury to the 
beneficiary demanded an exception to the privity rule); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 
N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) (stating that generally, an attorney is immune from 
liability to third persons unless that attorney acted maliciously). 
156. E.g. McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9, 14 (Ark. 1999) (indicating that one 
exception to the lawyer-immunity statute includes any statement by the attorney that 
constitutes fraud); accord Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d at 638; Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 
196,201-202 (Wyo. 1990). 
157. E.g. Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629, 633 (Ind. App. 1987) (attorney who 
drafts a will owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary because ordinary principles of 
negligence apply in a cause of action for malpractice for the known intended 
beneficiaries of a testamentary scheme); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 48 (Kan. 1990) 
(holding that the appellant was entitled to bring suit as there was no dispute that 
appellant was a foreseeable beneficiary to the trust); Killingsworth v. Schlater, 292 So. 
2d 536, 543 (La. 1973) (finding that the legatees were entitled to recover damages as 
third-party beneficiaries for breach of the attorney's stipulation to legally draft the 
will); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Md. 1998) (requiring plaintiff to prove 
direct employment relationship or that he or she was the intended third-party 
beneficiary under the narrow exception to the strict privity requirement); Calivas, 650 
A.2d at 322 (holding that "although there [was] no privity between a drafting attorney 
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a. Bad Conduct Exception 
Courts willingly deviate from strict privity when the attorney's 
conduct is fraudulent, malicious,159 or improper. 160 Exceptions to 
strict privity are also made for collusion,161 and intentional 
and an intended beneficiary, the obvious foreseeability of injury to the beneficiary 
demand[ed] an exception to the privity rule"); Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 
1062 (Okla. 2002) (extending a duty created by a contract to a third party when the 
contract is made expressly for the benefit of a third-party); Roberts v. Fearey, 986 P.2d 
690, 693 (Or. App. 1999) (finding a duty to non-clients when the plaintiff was the 
"intended" third-party beneficiary of the attorney's relationship with a client); Guy v. 
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a beneficiary had a cause of 
action against the attorney who drafted the will based either on a negligence or a third-
party beneficiary theory); Rutter v. Jones, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Va. 2002) (requiring 
that in order to proceed on a third-party beneficiary contract theory, the party claiming 
the benefit must show that the parties to a contract clearly and definitely intended to 
confer a benefit upon him). 
158. See e.g. Arnold v. Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1988) 
(finding that an attorney who had redrafted will, but had omitted a residuary clause, 
was the proximate cause for the loss to intended testamentary beneficiaries); Harrigfeld 
v. Hancock, 364 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that an attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the named beneficiaries to effectuate the 
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments); Schreiner v. Scoville, 
410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987) (stating that a cause of action ordinarily arises only 
when as a direct result of the lawyer's professional negligence, the testator's intent as 
expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part, and the 
beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized); Ginther v. 
Zimmerman, 491 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Mich. App. 1992) (holding that "where the intent 
of the testator as expressed in the testamentary instrument is not frustrated, an attorney 
owes no duty that will give rise to a cause of action to persons not named in the 
instrument"). 
159. See e.g., Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21,23 (Colo. App. Div. 21994) (finding 
that an attorney is not liable to non-client absent fraudulent or malicious conduct); 
Luikart v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. 1932) (defining malice as the intentional 
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with the intent to inflict injury or 
under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent). 
160. See Brainerd Dispatch Newsp. Co. v. Crow Wing County, 264 N.W. 779, 780 
(Minn.1936) (defining fraud and collusion); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-310 
(1987 & Supp. 2003) (providing statutory provisions that allow a third party to sue an 
attorney for negligence when the attorney's conduct constitutes fraud or intentional 
misrepresentation. Fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of the truth for the 
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it, to part with some valuable thing 
belonging to him.). 
161. See Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Md. App. 1997) (discussing an 
attorney's liability to third parties when fraud, collusion, or malice exists). 
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misrepresentation. 162 This article has designated these situations as the 
"bad conduct exception" because they involve inexcusable conduct by 
the attorney. The bad conduct exception only provides third parties 
with an avenue for recovery when the third party was a victim of the 
attorney's bad behavior. Thus, the bad conduct exception rewards third 
parties while punishing the attorney for his or her actions. The bad 
conduct exception is aimed at deterring bad conduct and echoes the 
view that such conduct should not and will not be tolerated. Thus, by 
engaging in bad conduct, the attorney extends his or her duty of care to 
the third party. 163 The bad conduct exception requires an intentional 
component to the attorney's actions or inactions that is absent when a 
patent ambiguity is at issue. l64 
This article's proposal is consistent with the theory of third party 
accountability used for the bad conduct exception. Like the bad 
conduct exception, when an attorney's negligence escalates to the level 
that results in a testamentary document that is prepared with a patent 
defect, third parties should be provided with an avenue to pursue 
recovery. It is only with this level of accountability that future harm 
will be deterred. 
b. Third-Party Beneficiary Exception165 
When the third party can show that he or she was closely 
connected to the services rendered, jurisdictions are willing to extend 
the duty of care to those third parties. 166 Jurisdictions justify this 
exception with a variety of terms referring to the third party as the 
162. See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-310 (defining intentional 
misrepresentation as a false representation of a matter of fact that deceives and is 
intended to deceive another so that he or she acts upon it to his or her legal injury). 
163. Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (finding that the 
pleadings were sufficient to establish that attorneys owed a duty to non-clients who 
were intended recipients of client's gifts causa mortis and supported a legal malpractice 
action by the non-clients against the attorneys). 
164. Although a patent ambiguity could result from an intentional act, such as the 
attorney's deliberate failure to designate an intended beneficiary, that situation is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
165. Many courts use the term third-party beneficiary in their analysis of the privity 
cases. The classification of this strict privity exception does not mirror that discussion. 
See infra pt. IV.B.3.a. (discussing the elements of the balancing of factors test). 
166. Supra n. 157 (discussing cases following third-party beneficiary exception). 
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"identified beneficiary,,167 or requiring the third party to establish he or 
she was the "direct purpose of the estate planning transaction.,,168 By 
requiring the third party to establish this sufficient connection to the 
services rendered, the likelihood of frivolous suits is lessened. 169 
However, by imposing such requirements, the third party harmed by 
the patent ambiguity is oftentimes no better served. For example, a 
third party harmed by a will with a patent ambiguity that fails to 
identify that third party will be unable to satisfy this exception. 170 In 
the situation of non-identified property,171 or duplication, 72 the third 
party faces a significant burden in order to satisfy the third party 
beneficiary exception because courts have created a patchwork of rules 
and terms,173 with little uniformity.174 This patchwork of law and 
167. See e.g. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994); 
Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983). 
168. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Md. 1998) (holding that the client's 
intent to benefit the non-client must be a direct purpose of the transaction or the 
attorney-client relationship in order for the non-client to be considered a third-party 
beneficiary). 
169. See Martin, supra n. 146, at 279 (discussing that if an exception to the strict 
privity requirement is enacted, additional requirements on third parties would be 
necessary to prevent frivolous suits). 
170. See Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d 702, 703, 705 (D.C. 1990) In Knupp, the patent 
ambiguity was a disposition of the residual estate to the person designated in the eighth 
paragraph of the will. Paragraph eight made a personal representative appointment and 
did not refer to the disposition of the testator's residual estate. The appointed personal 
representative was the person who claimed harm as a result of the patent defect but he 
would not have been able to satisty the third-party exception because he was not an 
identified beneficiary. !d. at 703. 
171. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986). 
172. Succession of Neff, 716 So. 2d 410, 410-411 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998). 
173. See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983) (requiring the 
third party to be the "direct and intended" beneficiary of the attorney-client 
relationship). See Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49 (Kan. 1990) (requiring the third 
party claimant to be a "foreseeable" third party); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 
625 (Md. 1985) (establishing the rule that third party recovery in an attorney 
malpractice case is whether the intent of the client to benefit the third party actually 
existed, not whether the client could have intended to benefit third party); Simpson v. 
Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321 (N.H. 1994) (referencing this exception as an "intended" 
beneficiary). 
174. See In re Sandersfeld Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447 (App. 4th Dist. 1960) (holding 
that the meaning of the word "home" was a latent ambiguity and allowed extrinsic 
evidence); see also Carlisle v. Est. of Carlisle, 252 So. 2d 894, 895 (Miss. 1971) 
(admitting extrinsic evidence even though that the uncertainty of the word "home" was 
labeled a patent ambiguity). 
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terms further adds to the difficulties faced by the third party in bringing 
suit under this exception. 
c. Frustrated Intent Exception 
Other jurisdictions have carved out a narrow exception for patent 
defects if the error contradicts the testator's expressed intent. This 
exception is sometimes referred to as the "Florida-Iowa exception,,,175 
deviates from strict privity when the testamentary intent as "expressed 
in the testamentary instruments" is frustrated. 176 This rule most often 
applies where there are errors in the execution of the testamentary 
document. 177 For example, in order for this exception to provide an 
avenue for recovery to a third party harmed by a patent ambiguity, the 
testamentary document would require a statement such as "I intend to 
benefit my daughter," followed by a legacy with no designated 
beneficiary. It is difficult to imagine why an attorney who would be 
careless enough to prepare a testamentary document with a patent 
ambiguif( would incorporate non-required direct statements of 
intent. 17 Thus, this exception will not likely provide the third party 
with recourse when the defective document includes a patent 
ambiguity. 
When the testamentary document is patently defective, the strict 
privity exceptions are insufficient and unlikely to adequately protect 
third parties harmed by an attorney's carelessness.179 Not one case that 
175. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 262-263 (discussing the Florida-Iowa rule allowing a 
beneficiary to maintain a cause of action against the estate-planning attorney only if the 
client's intent, as expressed in the will or other document, is frustrated). 
176. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 364 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
an attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named 
or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator, to 
have them properly executed so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the 
testamentary instruments). 
177. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 333 (discussing the types of errors more likely to satisfy 
this exception). 
178. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 6100 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. Est. Powers 
& Trusts L. § 3-21 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2004) (explaining that statements of 
intent are not statutorily required). 
179. See e.g. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994) 
(deciding that attorney who drafted decedent's will and trust owed no duty to intended 
beneficiaries and, thus, beneficiaries could not assert legal malpractice claim based on 
alleged failure to amend gift provisions of will in accordance with amendments made 
to trust); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (finding that "the 
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applied these narrow exceptions involved a patent ambiguity.180 This 
suggests that third parties harmed by a patent defect have no greater 
chance to recover under the strict privity exceptions than they have 
under strict privity. 
3. Other Approaches Developed to Accommodate Third Parties 
a. Balancing of Factors Test 
A majority of jurisdictions have abandoned strict privity and strict 
privity exceptions for the "balancing of factors" test. 181 This test 
considers a number of criteria in determining whether a duty is owed 
by the attorney to a third party. The California Supreme Court 
developed this test and was the first to deviate from the inequitable 
consequences of strict privity.182 The factors to be considered are: (1) 
The extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, 
interests of the testatrix and the intended beneficiary with regard to the proper drafting 
and execution of the will were the same"); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1276 (Md. 
1998) (stating that the non-client must allege and prove that the intent of the client to 
benefit the non-client was a direct purpose of the transaction or relationship. In this 
situation, the test for third party recovery is whether the intent to benefit actually 
existed, not whether there could have been an intent to benefit the third party.); but see 
Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (finding that under a third-
party beneficiary theory it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the lawyer will 
be held liable for a failed gift or testamentary transfer while the client is still living and 
competent). 
180. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 283-293 (discussing the Florida-Iowa Rule and cases 
where this exception failed). 
181. E.g. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Fleming, 58 P.3d 965, 967 (Ariz. App. Div. 2, 
2002); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 
21; Blair v. lng, 21 P.3d 452, 463 (Haw. 2001); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4,5 
(Minn. 1981); Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. 1995); Albright v. 
Burns, 503 A.2d 386,390 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986); Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 
4, 7 (D.N.M. 1982); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 354, 357 (N.c. App. 1984); Am. 
Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. Edwards & Angell, LLP, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
104 at *23 (July 26, 2002); Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32, 35 (S.D. 1986); Tomkins 
v. Beckley, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 443 at **11-12 (Mar. 9, 1999); Brammer v. 
Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 213 (W. Va. 1985); and Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 
325,329 (Wis. 1983). 
182. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 17, 19 (finding that where a notary public prepared an 
invalid will and caused the sole beneficiary named in the will to receive only one-
eighth of the estate by intestate succession, the notary public had a duty to exercise due 
care to protect sole beneficiary from injury and her negligence was the direct cause of 
beneficiary's loss). 
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(2) the foreseeability of the hann to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the 
connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) 
the moral blame attached to the attorney's conduct, and (6) the policy 
of preventing future hann. 183 Several years later, the California court, 
in Lucas v. Hamm, 184 applied these factors to an attorney malpractice 
case involving a negligence cause of action brought by will 
beneficiaries against the drafting attorney. In Lucas, the Court added 
an additional factor, which recognized that liability in such cases would 
not impose an undue burden on the legal profession. 18S In its 
justification for changing California's law, the Court recognized that 
without extending an attorney's duty of care to third parties in the 
estate-planning setting "no one would [ever] be able to recover.,,186 
In recent years, other states have recognized the need to expand 
from strict privity or strict privity exceptions allowing third parties to 
sue attorneys in malpractice. 187 In reaching their decision, the courts 
183. Id.atI9. 
184. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (holding that the lack of privity 
between the beneficiaries of a will and the attorney drafting the will did not preclude 
the beneficiaries from maintaining an action in tort for negligence in drafting the will 
because the extension of liability in the estate-planning setting would not be unduly 
burdensome). 
185. /d. 
186. Id. (finding that the relationship between the testator and the attorney was to 
provide the testator with a means by which he could transfer property to beneficiaries. 
If the testator's intent is frustrated due to negligent drafting by the attorney, and the 
intended beneficiaries are not able to maintain a cause of action, no one would be able 
to recover.). 
187. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Fleming, 58 P.3d 965, 967 (Ariz. App. Div. 2, 
2002). In Fleming, the court recognized public policy concerns and the importance of 
allowing the balancing of factors to determine whether or not an attorney was liable to 
an individual not in privity with him. Id. The Arizona courts balance the California 
factors which are: "(1) [T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the 
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injuries suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm." /d.; Donahue v. Shughart, 900 
S.W. 2d 624,629 (Mo. 1995) In Donahue, the court recognized the California test and 
acknowledged in Missouri there was no case law in which a third-party beneficiary had 
a cause of action against the attorney for negligence. The court then outlined the 
factors to be considered: "(1) [T]he existence of a specific intent by the client that the 
purpose of the attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiffs, (2) the foreseeability of 
the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's negligence, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney misconduct, (4) the 
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also evaluated the language set forth in section 51 (3) of the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which states that 
[ a] lawyer owes a duty of care ... to a third party when and to the 
extent that: (a) The lawyer knows that a client intends, as one of 
the primary objectives of the representation, the lawyer's services 
to benefit the third party; (b) such a duty would not significantly 
impair the lawyer's performance of obligations to the client; and 
c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those 
obligations to the client unlikely. ISS 
Although public policy warrants a departure from the harsh 
consequences of strict privity, the balancing of factors test is not 
without substantial cost to the injured third party.189 This test requires 
the third party to make a case within a case to recover from the 
attorney. First, the third party is required to prove he or she is entitled 
to bring the cause of action by satisfying a sufficient number of 
elements under this test. If successful, the third party may proceed 
with the malpractice action. Unfortunately, the series of factors 
examined by the various courts have not been consistently applied 
amongst jurisdictions, 190 and the third party faces a gamble, at best, in 
addressing the laundry list of factors that are subject to change. 191 
Although it is apparent that courts are striving for equitable outcomes 
in their consideration of facts and circumstances, the third party is 
forced to absorb the risks, burdens and significant costs associated with 
bringing the cause of action.192 
closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury, (5) the 
policy of preventing future hann, and (6) the burden on the profession of recognizing 
liability under the circumstances." Id. 
188. Restatement (Third) The Law of Governing Lawyers § 51(3); see also e.g. 
Kremser v. Quarles, 36 P.3d 761 (Az. 2001); Moore v. Anderson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
888 (App. 1st Dist. 2003); Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W. 2d 132 (Iowa 2003); 
Pivnick v. Beck, 165 NJ 670 (2000). 
189. Auric v. ContI. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 2d 325, 328 (Wis. 1983) (stating that there is 
a constitutional right to execute a will and have it carried out according to the testator's 
intentions, and by allowing an intended beneficiary to bring a cause of action against 
the attorney, the attorney will be held accountable for his actions). 
190. Supra n. 187 (discussing two cases where the California factors are not applied 
identically). 
191. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961) (including an additional 
factor to be considered). 
192. Attorney's fees and costs of litigation are significant and will be necessarily 
absorbed by the third party bringing the cause of action. 
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It should not be necessary for a third party to face these hurdles 
when a patent ambiguity is at issue. The third party should not be 
required to bring a cause of action which could be financially draining 
and physically exhausting. These burdens in and of themselves 
sufficiently discoura~e such causes of action and amount to a waste of 
judicial resources. 19 Instead, because of the existence of a patent 
ambiguity, the attorney should be held accountable for his or her 
obvious error and the foreseeable harm. 194 
b. Foreseeable Reliance Theory 
In some states, the basis for determining an attorney's liability to 
a third party under the balancing of factors test is deemed too broad 
and risks great interference with the attorney-client relationship.195 In 
response, several jurisdictions have established an alternate theory 
known as the foreseeable reliance theory.196 This theory relaxes the 
harsh consequences of strict privity, allowing third party liability on a 
more limited scale. The foreseeable reliance theory states that an 
attorney owes a duty to a third party if it is foreseeable that the third 
party will rely on the specific services rendered by that attorney.197 In 
193. Since the attorney and/or his or her insurance carrier (herein defendants) will be 
required to make the third party whole, the defendants will likely expend exorbitant 
amounts to preclude recovery. This is especially true because damages will oftentimes 
depend on the size of the estate. 
194. This article is not advocating for damages greater than what the third party 
would have received had the defect not occurred. See Dobbs, supra n. 21 (defining 
compensatory damages). 
195. See e.g. Tom W. Bell, Student Author, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of 
Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533, 1538 (1992). "[A] California 
appellate court pared down the balancing ... of [factor test of] attorney liability to 
focus attention on situations in which 'the foreseeability of harm to the third party as a 
consequence of professional negligence, is not out-weighed by other policy 
considerations.'" Id. 
196. See e.g. Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 9-30 (1966) (holding that "liability for a 
negligent performance of a contract ... should be imposed where the injury to the 
plaintiff is foreseeable and where the contract is an incident to an enterprise of the ... 
[attorney] and there are adequate [policy] reasons for imposing a duty of care"); see 
Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 805 (1996) (finding that "an attorney may [be held to] 
owe a duty to [third parties] who the attorney knows will rely on the services 
rendered"); Harper v. Harsh, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121, *4 (Feb. 7, 1992) (holding 
an attorney "liable to a ... third party who is known by him to be relying upon his 
proper preparation of a document affecting vested rights of the third party"). 
197. Williams, 668 N.E.2d at 805. 
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these jurisdictions an attorney has a duty not only to his client for 
whom the testamentary documents are being prepared, but also to the 
foreseeable third parties who will rely on those services. 198 The 
foreseeable reliance theory requires the third party to prove reliance, 
which is oftentimes a difficult task. In order for this exception to 
apply, the third party would need to be involved in the client's estate-
planning process. This would impose an obligation on the client to 
make the third party aware of the document's contents prior to his or 
her death and put the attorney on notice of the third party's knowledge. 
This presents a problem when the client desires to keep his or her will 
contents private until his or her death. 199 Under this theory, one court 
held that an attorney advising a client owes no duty to third persons 
affected by that advice "in the absence of a showing that the legal 
advice was foreseeably transmitted to or relied upon by 
plaintiffs .... ,,200 The use of the theory by a third party is further 
complicated by the courts' interpretation of whether the attorney's 
actual knowledge of the third party's reliance is required. One court 
found that actual knowledge was not required so long as the average 
lawyer could foresee such reliance.201 Similar to the proposal made by 
this article, the impact on the attorney-client relationship and the 
attorney's ability to provide zealous representation are necessarily 
compromised for the greater good of providinfi the needed protection to 
third parties harmed by the patent ambiguity.2 2 
When the patent ambiguity is an unidentified beneficiary, this 
theory offers no recourse for the third party. Moreover, for all patent 
defects under this theory, third parties will have a difficult time proving 
reliance unless he or she was actively engaged in the client's estate-
198. Harper, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 at *4. 
199. Dobris, supra n. 2 (differentiating a will, which becomes public record when 
offered for probate, and a revocable trust, which does not become public unless it 
becomes part oflitigation). 
200. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 743 (1976). The Goodman court also 
explained that, "To make an attorney liable for negligent confidential advice not only 
to the client who enters into a transaction in reliance [on that advice] but also to the 
other parties to the transaction with whom the client deals at arm's length would inject 
undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney's [counseling] role," and 
would result both in an "undue burden upon the profession and a diminution in the 
quality of the legal services received by the client." Id. at 739. 
201. Harper, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 at *7. 
202. See supra n. 148 and accompanying text (5) (discussing the conflict of interest 
to justifY application of the strict privity rule). 
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planning process. Requiring the third party's participation in the 
client's estate-planning process imposes significant obligations on the 
client, which may be undesirable and unknown.203 
Other approaches to resolving patent ambiguity when a third 
party's interests are at stake have proved inadequate. They place 
financial burden and risk of litigation on the third party, and thereby, 
make a successful malpractice action unlikely. The third party who 
suffers damages as a result of a testamentary document prepared with a 
patent ambiguity warrants real protection to recover for his or her 
harm. Protection can only be achieved by mandating compensation 
from the attorney whose carelessness caused the harm. Without such 
protections, this degree of negligence will not be curtailed or deterred, 
and will continue. 
When a testamentary document is prepared with a patent defect, 
the preparer should be accountable to the third party harmed by the 
ambiguity. When the attorney's standard of care falls significantly 
beneath the client's reasonable expectation of competent 
representation, such as when a patent ambiguity exists in a will or trust, 
then the attorney's duty should automatically extend beyond the client 
to those harmed by the patent defect. Similar to the bad conduct 
exception, a third party who can show harm with extrinsic evidence 
should be given an avenue for recovery.204 Negligence to this degree 
is easily avoided with appropriate standards and procedures during the 
estate-planning process and should not be tolerated. 
V. DETER FUTURE HARM WITH THE AID OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
This article proposes the mere existence of a patent ambiguity in a 
testamentary document gives rise to an inference of negligence and is 
sufficient to allow an in~ured third party to proceed against the attorney 
in a malpractice action. 05 Having alleged harm supported by reliable 
extrinsic evidence, damages are determined based on what the third 
party would have received had the patent defect not occurred.206 This 
proposal is intended to make it easier and more cost effective for third 
203. The client may not be advised by the attorney of the third party's required 
participation in his or her estate-planning process. 
204. See supra pt. IV.B.2.a. 
205. McLain, supra n. 127, at § 301:4 (explaining that the inference of negligence 
resulting from a patent ambiguity may also be tenned "prima facie evidence"). 
206. See Dobbs, supra n. 21 (defining compensatory damages). 
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parties harmed by the patent defect to sue the attorney in 
malpractice.207 To deter the gross carelessness, which allowed the 
testamentary document to be prepared with a patent ambiguity, the law 
must allow the injured third party to proceed against the responsible 
attorney without the senseless need to prove he or she is worthy of 
doing so.2°8 Like the bad conduct exception this proposal will deter 
future harm from this inexcusable carelessness.209 
Alternatives to this article's proposal do exist. For example, 
some scholars may argue that the doctrine of reformation is the proper 
method for remedying patent defects in a will or trust. 210 Reformation 
is an equitable remedy used to modify a written agreement to reflect 
the actual intent of the parties; however, after the testator's death, it is 
not a viable solution, because actual intent cannot be determined with 
certainty. 
Another solution might be to liberally admit extrinsic evidence, 
similar to the way in which it is used for latent ambiguities.211 
Currently five jurisdictions openly allow extrinsic evidence to explain 
patent ambiguities.212 Other jurisdictions have eliminated the 
patent/latent distinction by mis-classifting the patent ambiguity as 
latent and admitting extrinsic evidence. 13 Some courts adhere to the 
no extrinsic evidence rule in the case of a patent ambiguity despite the 
207. Damages would include recovery for reasonable attorney's fees. 
208. See supra pt. IV.B.2 & 3. (discussing the approaches requiring a third party 
claimant to prove that he or she was entitled to proceed with the malpractice action). 
209. See supra pt. IV B.2.a. 
210. E.g. deFuria, supra n. 36, at 1; John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American 
Law?, 30 U. Pa. L. Rev. 521 (1982). 
211. See supra pt. II.B.2.(discussing extrinsic evidence rule for latent ambiguities). 
212. See e.g. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting 
that Wisconsin, Arizona, New York and Maine allow extrinsic evidence to explain 
patent ambiguities); In re Hurley, 248 N.W. 194, 195 (S.D. 1933) (allowing extrinsic 
evidence in the construction of patent ambiguities); Carlisle v. Estate of Carlisle, 252 
So. 2d 894, 895 (Miss. 1971) (finding that the word meaning of the "home" a patent 
ambiguity, and therefore, allowing extrinsic evidence). 
213. Brandt, supra n. 67, at 24. "Extrinsic evidence will not come in to explain a 
patent ambiguity-one that appears on the face of the document, but will be admissible 
to cure a latent ambiguity---one that does not appear on the face of the will, but instead 
appears when the will is applied to the testator's property or beneficiaries. . .. The 
latent/patent distinction for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is problematic, at 
best." Id. 
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consequences and the reliability of extrinsic evidence.214 For example, 
in one case in the District of Columbia, despite the fact that all 
available extrinsic evidence pointed to the plaintiff, the property 
escheated.215 The truth is that the distinction between patent and latent 
ambiguities for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is shrinking. 2 16 
Liberal~ admitting extrinsic evidence reflects the client's alleged 
wishes, 17 prevents unjust enrichment218 to those not intended by the 
testator, and allows the third party to recover from the estate. A rule 
favoring the admission of extrinsic evidence more likely insulates the 
attorney from paying for errors caused by his or her negligence. If the 
third party recovers from the estate, he or she can not recover again 
from the attorney for malpractice. A liberal rule of construction as to 
patent defects will not force attorneys to improve practices to avoid 
future harm, but instead will rescue them from liability.219 However, 
there is a greater good in preventing future harm, which is ignored 
when extrinsic evidence is admitted. A rule that freely considers 
extrinsic evidence would not deter the patent ambiguity problem. 
Furthermore, there is no assurance that using extrinsic evidence to 
resolve the patent ambiguity will accurately ascertain the true 
intentions of the testator. Due to the testator's absence, extrinsic 
evidence provides no certainty?20 Although this rule of construction 
attempts to do what the testator intended from the start, it would place 
the careless attorney at a lower risk of being sued. The law is filled 
with rules of construction, which assist the sloppy estate planners. For 
214. See Knupp v. D.C.. 578 A.2d 702,705-706 (D.C. 1990). "No matter how clearly 
a testator's wish to make a particular disposition may appear from sources outside the 
will, a court [cannot] give it effect unless the words written into the will effect that 
disposition or are reasonably susceptible to ... interpretation." /d. In Knupp, the 
extrinsic evidence included an affidavit by the attorney "admitting that he ... failed to 
designate a residual beneficiary in the will even though the testator had instructed him 
to name Knupp" and the fact that the testator's two prior wills named Knupp. [d. at 
704. 
215. [d. at 703. 
216. Brandt, supra n. 67, at 24. 
217. Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325,328 (Wis. 1983). 
218. John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills: The 
Restatement of Wills Delivers New Tools (and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers, Prob. 
& Prop. 28, 31 (Jan./Feb. 2004). 
219. Supra n. 183 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of factor element 
of preventing future harm). 
220. See Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1373 n. 51. 
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example, the presumption a~ainst intestacy,221 the four-corner rule,222 
and the plain meaning rule2 3 protect the sloppy estate-planner. This 
article suggests that extrinsic evidence should be used to ascertain the 
injury caused by the patent ambiguity. Thus, all extrinsic evidence 
should be considered to determine which third party was harmed and to 
what extent.224 This proposal advocates for the use of extrinsic 
evidence, not to save the negligent attorney from liability, but to 
determine who should recover from the attorney and how much. 
This proposal is not overly burdensome for general practitioners 
or sole proprietors. It will require them to implement essential steps 
and procedures to avoid patent defects in testamentary documents. 
Holding attorneys accountable for the grossly negligent preparation of 
testamentary documents will require estate planners to shape up or ship 
out. This policy will prevent future harm and will provide an incentive 
for attorneys to pay greater attention to detail and encourage 
specialization.225 
This author acknowledges that the lack of certainty in 
ascertaining harm remains. An unavoidable risk exists that the patent 
ambiguity may be resolved in favor of the beneficiary who is best 
positioned to litigate.226 The extrinsic evidence itself can assist the 
court in its determination as to reliability. However, the overriding 
policy that makes it necessary to protect against the carelessness that 
221. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 262. 
222. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 812 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2004) 
(finding that "[u]nder the 'four comers rule,' a written agreement must be presumed to 
speak the intention of the parties who signed it and the intentions regarding its 
execution must be determined from the language used, unchanged by extrinsic 
evidence"). 
223. Plain meaning rule is defined as "if a writing, or a provision in a writing, 
appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the 
writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence." Black's Law Dictionary at 
1188. 
224. Supra n. 21 (discussing that damages naturally flow and will depend on the size 
of the estate or the patent defect. For example, if the patent uncertainty failed to 
designate a residual beneficiary, then the amount that passes intestate as a result of the 
defect should be the amount of damages received by the individual who would have 
taken the rest and residue but for the patent defect.). 
225. These are skills that academics impress upon students with the hopes that they 
will follow students as they enter into the practice oflaw. 
226. See generally Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (discussing attorney's 
need to defend and the costs they might be willing to spend to do so). 
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caused the patent ambiguity nonetheless warrants these changes in the 
law to allow the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show injury. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the estate-planning area, the standard of competent 
representation amounts to a detailed set of requirements necessary to 
ensure the document complies with statutory formalities and is free 
from patent ambiguities. Yet, an attorney's failure to render this level 
of service is of no consequence to the negligent attorney. The current 
law fails to impose a duty on the attorney to draft documents free from 
patent ambiguities that would extend to and protect third parties at the 
testator's death. The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary 
document should be prima facie negligence.227 This article proposes 
that when legal services are rendered in the preparation of testamentary 
documents, the duty of care, which amounts to competent 
representation, requires that the resulting document be free from patent 
ambiguities, and further, that such duty be extended to third parties. 
Third parties harmed by the patent ambiguity must be permitted to 
introduce extrinsic evidence, not to insulate the attorney from a 
malpractice claim, but to fuel his or her cause of action. 
Current law provides insufficient protection for such an obvious 
error. In light of the consequences to the third party, policy warrants 
changes that equate to a real remedy and will deter future harm. 
Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor existing 
malpractice rules serve as a sufficient deterrent. These proposed 
changes will encourage competent representation and provide third 
parties with a viable avenue to pursue a remedy when testamentary 
documents are patently defective. 
227. This is not the first time a permitted inference of negligence has been drawn. 
See e.g. Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 213 (W. Va. 1985) (finding that negligent 
supervision of the testator's codicil would be prima facie negligence). 
